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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally the financial sector has been led by men but during the 21st century gender 
diversity has increased also in the financial sector. Due to the banks' important role in 
society, it is essential that banks are governed by a competent board of directors and banks 
perform well. This study examines the impact of board gender diversity on European 
banks' financial performance over the period from 2011 to 2017. During this sample 
period, the percentage of women on the board of directors increased by 90.23 %. Using 
panel data analysis, I find a statistically significant correlation between the percentage of 
female board members and banks' financial performance measured by return on assets 
(ROA) and by Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, I find a statistically significant and inverse 
relationship between the percentage of female board members and banks’ financial 
performance measured by net interest margin. In addition, the impact of Basel III 
regulation on banks with different level of board gender diversity is examined. Applying 
the difference-in-differences estimation model, I find that after the prescription of Basel 
III, banks with a higher percentage of women on their boards had 1.76 % higher values 
of Tobin’s Q. The results of this study suggest that the composition of the board of 
directors impacts on the bank's financial performance and the development toward more 
gender diversified boards support the companies' success in the business.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
The amount of research focusing on corporate governance has increased dramatically 
during the last two decades. Optimal governance can offer several benefits for companies 
compared to the competitors and this makes the composition of corporate governance 
essential. The governances’ composition and characteristics define corporate governance 
and impact on corporations operational and financial performance. Historically most of 
the board members have been men, but over the last few decades the representation of 
women on the board has increased.  
 
Even though the board gender diversity has become the topic of the academic discussion, 
most of the board members are still men. The researchers over the world have approached 
the topic from different aspects. Most of them have ended up in the conclusion that female 
board members have a significant impact on corporate governance and through that to 
firm performance. (Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003, Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
2008, Isidro and Sobral 2015, Farrell and Hersch 2005). Nonetheless, there are also 
studies with opposite results. (Ahern and Dittmar’s 2012, Adams and Ferreira 2009). 
When women and men have been investigated in the field of finance, two major 
differences between the genders arises. According to the studies, men are more 
overconfident and take more risk compared to women. (Estess & Hosseini 1988, Schubert 
& Brown & Gysler & Brachinger 1999, Barber & Odean 2001, Huang & Kisgen 2013, 
Montford & Goldsmith 2016 etc.). The differences between the genders may explain the 
differences between outcomes of the diversified boards and the non-diversified boards.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 1 below the percentage of female board members of large 
European publicly traded banks has doubled during the 2010s. In 2011, the average 
percentage of female board members was 15.35 % when in 2017, it was 29.20 %. Both 
percentages are low, but the development toward more gender diversified boards is 
clearly visible in the financial sector which has historically been dominated by men. 
Based on the several studies about the gender differences presented earlier, it is important 
to investigate whether this development in board composition of European banks also 
impacts on the banks’ financial performance.  
 8 
 
Figure 1. The percentage of female board members in European publicly traded banks 
with total assets over 25 M Eur.  
 
 
Figure 2 below illustrates how the percentage of female board members has changed over 
the period from 2011 to 2017 in different parts of Europe: Nordic Europe (Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, Denmark), Central Europe (Switzerland, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Austria, Hungary, Germany), Western Europe (United Kingdom, France, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Belgium), and Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Cyprus). As 
we can see from Figure 2, the proposition of female members on the board has increased 
in all regions during the selected period of time. The development toward more gender 
diversified board has been the fastest in Southern Europe. The percentage of female 
members has increased 178.62 % during the period in Southern Europe while it has 
increased 68.31 % in Central Europe. The growth has been over double times faster in 
Southern Europe than in Central Europe. Actually, as we can see from Figure 2, the 
percentage of female members has slightly decreased after year the 2016. 
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Figure 2. The percentage of female board members in European publicly traded banks 
by regions with total assets over 25 M Eur. 
 
 
Most of the studies focus particularly on governance of nonfinancial firms and firms in 
unregulated industries even if the key aspects of corporate governance are relevant 
especially among the banking industry. For instance, the problems related to different 
types of ownership and control issues are relevant in the banking industry and the 
stakeholders of the financial institutes want to ensure that the assets are allocated 
effectively. Additionally, informational asymmetries are generally larger in the banking 
business than in the other industries. (De Andres & Vallelado 2008.) 
 
The banking crisis of 2008 advertises how the poor governance of banks may have 
enormous consequences to bank performance and through that to the whole economy. 
Especially, the biggest banks played a significant role during the crisis and problems of 
the biggest banks spread to the other industries as a domino effect. After the crisis, 
researchers have been more interested in the banks and banks’ position in the economy. 
For instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) noticed the need for 
study, understand, and improve the corporate governance of financial institutions. The 
BCBS agree that corporate governance can improve the soundness of the financial system 
and the development of countries. (De Andres & Vallelado 2008.) 
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It is important to understand the differences between the governance of the banking 
industry and the governance of nonfinancial industry. For instance, the banks face 
generally larger informational asymmetries, stricter regulation, and more responsibilities 
when compares to the other companies of the society. (Levine 2004.) Furthermore, the 
governance of financial institutions is more complicated. The greater amount of parties 
with a stake in institutions activity lead to more complex corporate governance. Limited 
competition in both, managerial labor market and product market, may also impact on 
governance as well as the capital structure. (Adams & Mehran 2003.) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the largest banks play an important role in the economy. They have 
an enormous impact on financial stability and systemic risk. The importance of the 
financial stability of the economy has been emphasized during the last decade because of 
massive costs of the recent financial crisis, the explosive growth of the volume of 
transactions, and the development of even more complex financial instruments. One of 
the main factors of the crisis of 2008 was a systemic risk which is the risk associated with 
the failure or collapse of a firm or an industry. The event at the firm level may trigger the 
domino effect and the problems may spread from the firm to the whole economy.  History 
shows that the problems, especially in the banking industry, may rapidly spread to the 
other industries and in the worst case, problems may lead to the world-wide crisis. 
(Freixas & Laeven & Peydró 2015.) 
 
This study focuses on the largest publicly traded banks in European countries; Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The study investigates the impact of gender diversity 
on the corporate governance of the banks using the panel data analysis. The gender 
diversity is measured by the percentage of female board members on the board and the 
bank’s financial performance is measured using three different performance 
measurement; Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), and net interest margin. Tobin’s Q is a 
market-based measure for the company’s valuation and ROA and net interest margin are 
the accounting-based measures for the company’s profitability. 
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Also, banks operate in a more regulated environment than most of the other companies. 
For instance, the Basel Committee stipulated a new law in 2014, Basel III, which sets the 
international regulatory framework for banks (BIS 2011). Therefore, this study 
investigates also how bank regulation affects different types of banks: banks with many 
women on the board and banks with a few women on the board. 
 
As mentioned earlier, most of the previous studies focus on the US market and excludes 
financial companies. Instead, this study differs from previous studies using recent data of 
European banks. Furthermore, the previous studies focus on either accounting-based or 
market-based performance measures. This study brings together both performance 
measures, accounting-based and market-based.   
 
The results of this study reveal that banks with a higher proportion of female board 
members are more profitable measured by ROA. More gender diversified banks have 
approximately 1.02 % higher ROA ratio than banks with only a few or zero women on 
their boards. In addition, the banks with a higher proportion of female board members are 
expected to perform better in the future as well and these banks have 0.04 % higher 
Tobin’s Q ratio than banks with a smaller proportion of female board members on their 
boards on average. However, when the financial performance is measured by net interest 
margin, the relationship between the percentage of female board members and bank 
financial performance is inverse. The banks with a higher proportion of female board 
members have approximately 2.37 % lower Tobin’s Q. Studying how the Basel III has 
impacted on the bank performance in different types of banks: those with many women 
on their board and those with only a few, the results show that banks with many women 
on their board (at least 22.82 %) have 1.76 % higher Tobin’s Q than banks with only a 
few women on their boards after the prescription of the Basel III. When the bank 
performance is measured by ROA or net interest margin, the results are not statistically 
significant indicating that the impact of Basel III does not differ across the different types 
of banks. 
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1.1.The purpose of the study 
 
The primary goal of this study is to empirically examine the impact of female board 
members in the European banks on bank performance. The study focuses on gender 
diversity in the boardrooms and how the representation of the female board members 
affects the bank's financial performance. The bank's financial performance is measured 
by using both, accounting-based variables and market-based variable. Return of asset and 
net interest margin represent the accounting-based performance variables and Tobin’s q 
measures the market-based performance. In addition, the impact of Basel III is examined 
among the different types of banks: banks with many female board members and banks 
with only a few female board members. 
 
The reason to focus on the largest European banks measured by the total assets is their 
crucial role in the entire economic system explained earlier. In addition, the nature of the 
banking business makes the corporate governance problems of banks highly specific and 
important to research to understand the importance of corporate governance in the 
banking industry. (DeAndres & Vallelado 2008). Furthermore, European countries are 
rarely involved in research of corporate governance. Most of the studies use data from 
the US, the UK, or other singular countries but it is important to notice that the legislation 
variates between different countries that have an impact on corporate governance. For 
example, the US, the UK, and Canada have a common-law system when most of the 
European countries have a civil-law system. (De Andres & Vallelado 2008.) 
 
 
1.2. The structure of the study 
 
This research begins with the introduction of the purpose of the study and the presentation 
of the structure. Chapter two focuses on corporate governance. A theoretical framework 
is stated in the first part of the second chapter. The related theories; resource dependence 
theory, human capital theory, agency theory, and social psychological theory are 
introduced in chapter two. In addition, corporate governance in the banking industry is 
represented in this chapter, as well as, gender diversity in the boardroom and the 
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definition of how the gender diversity affects the corporate governance and firm value. 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm value is presented in the last part 
of this chapter. The third chapter continues by presenting the related literature and stating 
the hypotheses. The literature review focuses mainly on the effect of gender diversity on 
firm financial performance. Chapter four consists of the empirical analysis which begins 
with the presentation of data and variables of this study. Also, the methodology and the 
regression results are presented in this chapter. This study ends with the conclusions 
which are presented in chapter five.  
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2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
There is no unambiguous definition of corporate governance. Generally, corporate 
governance can be defined as the collection of control mechanisms for managing and 
monitoring the organization. These controlling mechanisms ensure that self-interested 
managers strive to the welfare of shareholders and stakeholders. The monitoring system 
includes at least a board of directors that supervises the management and an external 
auditor that evaluates the reliability of financial statements. However, the monitoring 
system can also be much broader including shareholders, creditors, regulators, media, 
investment analysts, labor unions, customers and suppliers. (Larcker & Tayan 2015: 7.) 
 
The institutional structures, legal rules, and best practices constitute corporate 
governance. These three components of corporate governance also determine which party 
is empowered to make the particular decisions within the corporation, how the members 
of that parties are selected, and which norms guide decision making within the 
corporation. Principles of corporate governance are derived from several sources such as 
rules of best practices, social norms, and laws. These sources specify the rules and 
procedures of decision making, the distribution of rights and responsibilities, and how the 
performance is monitored. (Bainbridge 2012: 2.) 
 
As mentioned earlier, a board of directors is a crucial part of the monitoring system. 
Besides of oversight role, the board is also expected to provide advisory functions. These 
responsibilities are focused on different duties even if the responsibilities are linked in 
many ways. The role of oversight obligates the board to supervise management and 
ensure that the management is acting in the interests of shareholders. To fulfill its 
oversight capacity, the board measures corporate performance, evaluates management 
contribution to performance, awards compensation, hires and fires the CEO (the chief 
executive officer), and oversees legal and regulatory compliance. In fulfilling its advisory 
role, the board consults management in the operational and strategic decision making 
regarding the direction of the company. The most relevant decisions are related to 
balancing risk and reward. An effective board member has the ability to fulfill both, 
oversight and advisory responsibilities. (Larcker & Tayan 2015: 57.) 
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According to the law, the board of directors is obligated to act in the interest of the 
corporation. This legal obligation is called as a fiduciary duty and it includes three 
components: a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of candor. Directors have to 
make a decision with due deliberation according to the duty of care. Instead, the duty of 
loyalty states that shareholders’ benefit should be promoted in conflicts of interest. The 
third duty, the duty of candor, requires that the board of the directors and the management 
of the corporation inform shareholders of all information that is important when 
shareholders evaluate corporation and its management. (Larcker & Tayan 2015: 66-68.) 
 
Board members are selected based on their skills and previous experiences in a relevant 
industry or functions. Typically, the board consists of a mixture of professionals with 
different managerial, functional, or other specialized backgrounds. Preferred 
characteristics of a director are current or former senior-level managerial experience 
(CEO, president, COO, chairman, or vice chairman), international experience, or 
experience from relevant industry. Corporations might also seek female directors or 
directors with ethnically diverse backgrounds if they believe that the diversity of personal 
characteristics can improve and diversify the decision making in the boardroom. (Larcker 
& Tayan 2015: 57-58, 79-85.) Because the theory of corporate governance suggests that 
the structure of the board has a strong impact on the actions and management on the 
board, the structure also impacts on the firm performance. One dimension of the structure 
is the demographic diversity of the board that also affect the firm performance. (Carter, 
D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson 2010.) 
 
To affecting the performance of senior executives and to motivate them to create the value 
of shareholders and stakeholders, executives are compensated for their work. The 
compensation committee together with the independent directors of the board approve 
the proposal of the compensation package. This compensation package can be formed 
from multiple sources such as annual salary, annual bonus, stock options, restricted 
stocks, performance shares, perquisites, contractual agreements, and other benefits. The 
compensation package is one of the most important board’s tool to affect the senior 
executives and their commitment to work in the interest of the shareholders, in other 
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words, to improve corporation’s financial performance. (Larcker & Tayan 2015: 211-
215.)  
 
 
2.1.Theoretical framework 
 
Any single theory is not able to explain the relationship between gender diversity on the 
board and firm financial performance. When combining several theories from various 
fields, it is possible to create a framework for the hypothesis tested in this study. Theories 
from economics, organization theory and social psychology are adopted in this study. 
 
 
2.1.1. Resource dependence theory 
 
According to the resource dependence theory created by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the 
board of the directors can provide the link between the corporation and the external 
organizations to the corporation. They show that the links to the external organizations 
can provide four benefits. First of all, these links can offer additional resources such as 
information and expertise. Second, the links may create the channels for the 
communication between the corporation and important external organizations and/or 
groups. The third benefit is the commitments of the support by the important external 
organizations and/or groups. Fourth, the links may create legitimacy for the firm in an 
external environment. 
 
The extension of resource dependence theory by Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) 
adds the types of the director to the set of benefits. The different director types are 
business experts, insiders, community influentials and support specialists. These director 
types may offer various beneficial resources to the corporation and as a result, the more 
diversified board may provide more valuable resources the corporation and through that 
improve the firm performance. 
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The resource dependence theory offers the basis for the most significant arguments 
relating to board diversity. A more diversified board may improve the information 
provided by the directors of the board to the management of the firm. Furthermore, the 
type of the diversity is significant and female and/or ethnic minority board members may 
offer unique information as well as the unique talent that can lead to the improved 
decision making of the management. Diverse directors can also bring new perspectives 
and non-traditional point of views to the decision making and the problems solving. 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978.) 
 
 
2.1.2. Human capital theory 
 
Human capital theory, created by Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009) is originally derived 
from the work of Becker (1964). Becker argues that the person's education, experience, 
and skills about stocks may offer benefits for the company. For the extension of Becker’s 
work, Terjesen et al. argue that gender has an impact on human capital and women have 
unique human capital, as well as men have. The argument "the claim that women lack the 
‘right’ human capital for directorships" indicates that women have unique human capital. 
The evidence shows that women are as qualified as men are in several aspects such as the 
level of education, but instead, women are less likely to have business expert experience. 
 
The human capital theory takes a stand some arguments that are relating to the board 
diversity and that is stated in the resource dependence theory. According to the human 
capital theory, the board diversity impacts on the performance of the board of the directors 
and result from the director's unique human capital and different demographic factors. 
However, this impact may be either positive or negative for the firm financial 
performance. (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009.) 
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2.1.3. Agency theory 
 
Agency theory, developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983a, b), is a theory about the problem which arises when management and 
finance, or using more standard terminology, ownership and control are separated in a 
firm. Agency theory is the most commonly used theoretical framework when studying 
and analyzing the relationship between board characteristics and firm value in the field 
of finance and economics. The nature of the problem occurs when parties have different 
goals or desires. According to the theory, managers may make detrimental decisions 
related to financing, investments, and payouts if they operate independently. Agency 
theory is developed to resolve two problems. The first problem relates to the nature of the 
problem, the difference between the principal's and the agent's goals, and the cost or 
difficulty of ensuring what the agent is doing. It is problematic for the principal to ensure 
that the agent acts appropriately. The other problem relates to the risk sharing and it 
emerges when parties have different attitudes toward risk. This is problematic because 
different risk preferences may lead to different actions. (Eisenhardt 1989.) 
 
The separation of ownership and control results always costs and these costs are called 
agency costs. Agency costs can be separated for the monitoring costs by the principal, the 
bonding costs by the agent, and the residual loss and are almost always greater than zero. 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976.) Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) prove with their study that the 
different ownership and management structures are related to the number of agency costs.  
 
 
2.1.4. Social psychological theory 
 
Westphal and Milton (2000) provide an opposite view of point. According to the study, 
demographically minority board members are viewed favorably by the stakeholders, but 
the literature is more pessimistic to define which group of demographic minorities of the 
board may successfully impact on the decision-making on the board. Social psychological 
theory is derived from the social impact theory which suggests that individuals who have 
majority role, have also disproportionation great amount of influence to effect on the 
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decision-making process in the group. Thus, the internal group dynamic may prevent the 
influence possibilities of minority board members. 
 
Westphal and Milton (2000) suggest that the central finding of the literature is that 
demographic differences between board members may deteriorate the social cohesion of 
the group. Thus, social barriers may decrease the possibility that the opinion of a minority 
board member can affect the decision-making process. However, some studies suggest 
that minority board members can also impact on decision-making and they can improve 
the divergent thinking in the decision-making processes. According to the study of 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), greater gender diversity in the boardroom 
encourages critical thinking and results in more diverse opinions that lead to more time-
consuming and less effective decision-making. When combining the theory and evidence, 
can be stated that the effect of demographic minority board members may be either 
positive or negative.  
 
 
2.2. Banks and corporate governance 
 
The governance of the banks has a central position. If managers are more likely to act in 
their own interests instead of the interests of principals, the effectivity of the asset 
allocation of the society may be harmed. Instead, if the bank manages to engage the 
management to act in the interest of principal, they are more likely to allocate assets 
efficiently. (Levine 2004.)   
 
Most of the previous studies focus particularly on non-financial firms in unregulated 
industries. One reason to study only non-financial firms is the complexity of the 
governance of financial institutions, such as banks. When studying the governance of the 
banks, have to take into consideration several factors that may have an impact on 
corporate governance. (Adams & Mehran 2003.) According to the studies of Aebi, Sabato 
and Schmid (2012) and Levine (2004) financial institutions have heavier regulation and 
intervention by the government and higher opaqueness that affect also the governance of 
financial firms. Both, greater opaqueness and government regulation, may weaken 
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several traditional governance mechanisms. The asymmetry of information caused by the 
complexity of the banking industry makes monitoring of managers’ decisions by 
stakeholders more difficult. Furthermore, banks are crucial for economic systems. They 
have a key role also in the payment system and they are generally highly leveraged firms. 
Additionally, banks protect the rights of depositors, maintain the stability of the payment 
system and decrease the systematic risk. Because of all these reasons, banks operate more 
regulated environment than other firms. (De Andres & Vallelado 2008.) Even if the 
countries do not tend to interfere in other industries, they generally stipulate extensive 
regulations in the banking industry. The regulations distort the bank's behavior and limit 
the normal process of corporate governance.  (Levine 2004.) 
 
Additionally, regulation can be several other impacts on corporate governance. First, 
regulation lowers the systematic risk, or it should lower. Even if the lower level of 
systematic risk can be good for society, it can come into conflict with the main target of 
the shareholders who have an endeavor to increase the value of the share. The conflict 
between these two goals generates a new agency problem. Second, regulation may 
weaken the effectiveness of other mechanisms of corporate governance. Especially, when 
regulation allows deposit insurances that restrict the supervision of the depositors, or 
when regulation decreases the number of operations allowed to banks. In addition, when 
regulation restricts the bank ownership it may have a negative impact on corporate 
governance and its mechanisms. (De Andres & Vallelado 2008.) 
 
Even if informational asymmetries are observed among all industries, evidence of the 
study of Furfine (2001) suggests that banks suffer from larger informational asymmetries. 
Banks are able to change the risk composition of their assets faster than most of the non-
financial firms and the quality of the loans is easier to hide for long periods of time. 
Furthermore, banks can also hide their problems by extending loans to their clients. 
Greater informational asymmetries can make the designing of the incentive contracts 
more difficult because the outcomes are difficult to measure, and managers can easily 
influence outcomes in the short-run. This opaqueness may have a negative impact on 
competition in labor and product markets, and it can weaken the competition. (Levine 
2004.) 
 21 
Because of the limited competition, heavier regulation than other industries, and higher 
informational asymmetry caused by the more complex environment of the banking 
industry, the role of boards as a function of corporate governance of banks is even more 
relevant. Among the banking industry, the board members should have specific 
knowledge of the complexity of the banking industry and this knowledge assists them to 
supervise management and advice management in strategical decisions efficiently. (De 
Andres & Vallelado 2008.)  
 
Furthermore, Aebi et al. (2012) argue that the role of risk management in the governance 
structure of financial firms differs from non-financial firms. They examine are the 
corporate governance mechanism that is related to the risk management related to better 
bank financial performance measured by ROE and buy-and-hold returns during the 
financial crisis from 2007 to 2008. Risk management mechanisms that are used in their 
study are the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and 
whether the CRO reports to the board of directors or to the CEO. Their result shows that 
if the CRO reports directly to the board of directors, the bank performs financially better. 
Their stock returns were significantly higher and also the ROE was higher level during 
the financial crisis. 
 
 
2.3. Gender diversity in the boardroom 
 
Besides of characteristics of financial institutions, also gender diversity may have an 
impact on board of directors and their style of working. Women can also offer different 
perspectives to decision making processes and add unique experiences compared to their 
male counterparts. (Daily and Dalton 2003.) According to the study of Adams and Funk 
(2012) women are different from men in the boardroom. Their study focuses on all 288 
publicly traded firms listed on the OMX and the NGM (Nordic Growth Market) in 
Sweden in 2005 and their survey includes all CEOs and board members of 288 publicly 
traded firms. Their findings suggest that female directors have different priorities than 
their male counterparts and these different priorities can lead to the different behavior of 
gender diverse boards when comparing to the traditional boards that include primarily 
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male directors. Their study also shows that female directors have systematically different 
core values and risk attitudes comparing to male directors. In addition, female directors 
are more benevolent and universally concerned than male but instead, male directors are 
more power oriented. Their results also suggest that if the gender composition of the board 
changes, it may have long-lasting effects on firm and firm performance. 
 
Huang and Kisgen (2011) investigate how the firm financial and investment decisions 
made by female executives differ from decisions made by male counterparties. Their 
result suggests that male executives are more overconfident when compared to female 
executives. For example, men issue debt more often and undertake more acquisitions 
when compared to women in top management. In addition, announcement returns of 
acquisitions and debt issues are lower levels when they are made by men. 
 
Even if several studies find evidence that women are more risk-averse and behave more 
conservative when compared to men (Faccio, Marchica and Mura 2016, Palvia, Vähämaa 
and Vähämaa 2015), result of the study of Berger, Kick and Schaeck (2014) suggests that 
changes that lead to a higher proportion of female executives increase bank risk-taking 
when focusing on banks and banks risk taking. Their empirical analysis covers German 
banks over the period 1994-2010.  
 
Bilimoria (2006) investigate the relationship between women corporate board directors 
and women officers. Her investigation focuses on firms listed in the 1999 Fortune 500 
list. The main purpose of her study is to investigate if the proposition of woman board 
directors has positive effects on the gender diversity among senior management of the 
firm. The findings of this study show that the greater amount of female board directors is 
significantly and positively related to the gender diversity of senior management. 
According to the article, female board directors and their visibility in the top level of the 
firm hierarchy may have an indirect impact on the representativeness of the female 
executives in other high-level positions. 
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2.4. Corporate governance and firm value 
 
Several previous studies prove the impact of characteristics of corporate governance on 
firm financial performance. According to the studies, characteristics such as the size of 
the board, the board leadership structure, the compensations of the directors, monitoring 
activity of board, CEO’s power, and diversity have an impact on firm financial 
performance.  
 
Booth, Cornett and Tehranian 2002, Adams and Mehran 2003 and Adams 2009a examine 
the size of banks and other non-financial firms. They find that banks tend to have larger 
boards which may lead to problems such as difficulties in the decision-making process. 
 
Staikouras, Staikouras, and Agoraki (2007) examine the correlation between the size of 
the Board of Directors and firm performance from 2002 to 2004. They focus on 58 large 
European banks and the particular time period is chosen because they wanted to study if 
the 1999 Basel Committee Paper on corporate governance for banking institutions may 
have an impact on the Board structure. Staikouras et al. measure bank performance by 
using both, market-based variable, Tobin’s Q, and accounting-based variables, return of 
asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). After controlling firm-specific variables, they 
find a significant and negative correlation between the size of the Board of Directors and 
bank profitability.  
 
When Saikouras et al. focus only on European banks, De Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
investigate the board of directors of 69 large international commercial banks from six 
OECD countries; Canada, the US, the UK, Spain, France, and Italy. They find an inverted 
U-shaped correlation between bank performance measured by firm market-to-book value 
ratio and board size. Also, a similar shaped relationship is between bank performance and 
the proportion of non-executive directors. According to the study, the composition and 
the size of the board of directors impact on directors’ ability to monitor and advice 
management. The results show that the larger and less independent boards may offer 
several benefits including more effective monitoring and advising role and improved 
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value creation. Their panel data is obtained from the Board Index from Spencer Stuart 
and it is from the period of 1996-2006. 
 
Also, Adams and Mehran (2012) focus on the correlation between the size of the Board 
and firm performance studying publicly traded banks and using 34 years of data. Contrary 
to the study of Staikouras et al., their study indicates that the size of the Board and the 
bank performance are positively related. According to the study, one possible explanation 
for the result is that there are more directors with a subsidiary directorship in larger 
boards.  
 
Guest (2009) also studies the impact on board size on firm performance. He examines 2 
746 listed firms in the UK over the period from 1981 to 2002. He also finds that board 
size has strongly and negatively correlated with firm profitability measured with Tobin’s 
Q and share returns. Evidence of this study indicates that communication problems and 
difficulties with decision making can lead the decrease in the effectiveness of large 
boards.  
 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) study how the board structure impacts on firm value. 
They find a U-shaped relation between Tobin's Q and firm size which suggests that the 
optimal size of the board is either very small or very large. In addition, they find that 
advising requirements are greater for more complex firms that tend to have larger boards 
and vice versa, more simple firms have normally smaller boards.  
 
The other broadly researched characteristic of the board is CEO duality. CEO duality 
means that the Chief Executive Officer is also the Chairman of the Board. The results of 
the studies relating to the correlation between CEO duality and firm performance are not 
as straightforward as result relating to the relation between the size of the Board and firm 
performance. Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli (2016) examine U.S. firms over the period 
from 1997 to 2011. They study a board leadership structure and focus on CEO duality. 
They find the statistically significant and negative relation between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Their evidence supports the argument that duality might decrease firm 
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performance. This argument is advanced by agency theorists and also some management 
scholars. 
 
Fooladi (2011) examine board structure and firm performance. He studies four board 
characteristics; board independence, CEO duality, ownership structure, and board size. 
He finds that only CEO duality has negatively correlated with firm performance measured 
by ROA and ROE. On contrary, other board characteristics are not significantly 
associated with firm performance. Also, Adams and Mehran (2012) end up to the same 
conclusion of uncorrelation between board independence and firm performance in banks.  
 
Faleye (2007) research also CEO duality and firm performance. His study ends up with 
the conclusion that the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance is 
contingent on the firm and the firm's CEO characteristics. Examining CEO duality and 
board independence in Malaysian firms over the period 1994-1996 Abdullah (2004) does 
not find a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance, or between board independence and firm performance. His findings suggest 
that the board structure has no impact on firm performance in Malaysia. Iyengar & 
Zampelli (2009) also ended up with a similar conclusion. 
 
Additionally, compensations of CEO and directors may have an impact on firm 
performance.  Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2005) study the correlation between CEO 
compensation, director compensation and firm performance over the 1992–2001 period. 
They find a highly statistically significant and positive relation between CEO 
compensation and director compensation. In addition, both, CEO compensation and 
director compensation are negatively correlated with firm performance. 
 
Powerful CEO can also affect firm performance. The study of Adams, Almeida, and 
Ferreira (2005) shows that the performance of the firms with greater influence power of 
CEO is significantly more variable. Their data is collected over the period 1992-1999 
from publicly traded firms in the 1998 Fortune 500 and firm performance is measured by 
Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA. According to the study, only if executives can 
influence the crucial decisions, they can impact on firm performance. 
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Brick and Chidambaran (2010) examine how board monitoring activity affects firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Instead, board monitoring activity does not impact on firm 
performance measured by ROA. The results suggest that the main benefit of board 
monitoring is to help identify investment opportunities instead of to improve current 
operational performance. They use panel data from 1999 to 2005 and they also notice that 
the regulatory pressure, especially the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, raises board activity. 
 
Among other characteristics that impact on firm performance, also gender diversity may 
have an impact on board composition and through that to firm performance. For example, 
studies of Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), 
Isidro and Sobral (2015), Farrell and Hersch (2005) have found a statistically significant 
and positive relationship between greater female representation in the firm and firm 
performance.  
 
In contrast, there are also studies that support the argument that corporate governance has 
no impact on firm financial performance. According to the study of Bhagat and Bolton 
(2007), none of the governance measures are associated with better performance, 
measured by future stock market performance. Instead, they find a relationship between 
operational performance and both, CEO-Chair separation and stock ownership of board 
members. 
 
How to measure the quality of governance can also have an impact on results. According 
to Brown and Caylor (2004), good governance can be positively or negatively correlated 
with firm performance. When they measure good governance by using executive and 
director compensation, the correlation is positive, but in contrast, by using charter/bylaw, 
the relationship is negative.   
 27 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Some argue that it is the tokenism that drives the selection of female board members. 
However, during the last decades, several studies have shown that female board members 
may have a significant impact on firm performance. This chapter presents the related 
literature and states the hypotheses which based on the previous studies.  
 
 
3.1. How greater gender diversity affect firm performance 
 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) also investigate women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Their result suggests that gender diversity has a significant 
impact on board governance even if the selection of female board members may be driven 
by tokenism. They find that female board members are more likely to join monitoring 
committees and have better attendance records compared to the male colleagues. 
Additionally, when the fraction of female board members is higher, male counterparties 
have fewer attendance problems. This suggests that female board members may 
positively impact also the behavior of their counterparties. More gender diversified 
boards also have more board meetings. Based on these results, they suggest that women 
board members have a positive impact on board governance and more gender-diverse 
boards allocate more effort on monitoring. Board members of more gender diversified 
boards attendance more often the board meetings and also schedule more board meetings. 
In addition, a higher percentage of their compensation is equity-based. They ended up the 
statement that greater gender diversity on the board is associated with negative firm 
performance, on average. The gender diversity adds firm value only firms with weak 
shareholder rights that need more monitoring. Their unbalanced panel of director-level 
data is collected from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500, S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap 
firms over 1996-2003. 
 
In addition, Bøhren and Strøm (2010) examine the economic rationale for board 
regulation in place. They find that when gender diversity is lower firm can create more 
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value for the owner of the firm. According to their study, politicians should support the 
idea of less gender diversified boards. 
 
Investigating the gender impacts on the selection of the director serving on the board and 
analyzing the factors that have an impact on the likelihood of boards adding a new 
director, Farrell, and Hersch (2005) also find evidence that women tend to serve on better-
performed firms. Furthermore, they find insignificant abnormal returns on the 
announcement of a female director added to the board of directors. Even if the women 
tend to serve in better-performed firms, adding the female director to the board of 
directors does not lead the value creation or destruction of the firm. Instead, because of 
the demand for female directors, women self-select better-performed firms. The demand 
for female directors may result from internal preferences or external pressures to increase 
female representation. Their data consists of firms in unregulated industries that are listed 
on the Fortune 500 or Service 500 lists during the period from 1990 to 1999.   
 
In addition, Peltomäki, Swidler, and Vähämaa (2016) suggest that firm outcomes may be 
dependent on gender and age of the firm's top executives. They investigate the 
relationship between age and gender of the firm's top executives and risk-taking among 
S&P 1500 firms from 2004 to 2014. Among other things, they find a strong positive 
association between firm riskiness, measured by total and idiosyncratic risk, and female 
CFO after controlling for incentives of managerial risk-taking, firm-specific attributes, 
and policy choices. Furthermore, they also find a positive correlation between female 
CEO and firm idiosyncratic risk. According to their study, the age of CEO (Chief 
Executive Officer) and CFO (Chief Financial Officer) is associated with lower level of 
idiosyncratic risk and less volatile stock returns. This result suggests that top-executives 
become more risk-averse when they become older. Because they state that the age of top 
executives is positively related to the level of risk-averse, and the female top executives 
tend to be younger, the effect of executive age on firm riskiness is confused the effect of 
gender of top executives. In addition, the age and gender of top-executive impact on 
financial and investment policies of firms.  
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Bear, Rahman, and Post (2010) investigate whether the number of women on the board 
of directors impacts on firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) and mediated to the 
firm reputation. The data is collected from Fortune’s 2009 World Most Admired 
Companies list that based on the survey published in March 2009. The evidence of this 
study suggests that the number of women on the board is positively and significantly 
related to the strength of CSR ratings. According to the study of Williams (2003), women 
may provide several benefits to the board and for example, increase the sensitivity to 
CSR. In addition, women can bring different decision-making styles and these benefits 
may lead the improved corporate responsibility strength ratings (Konrad, Kramer and 
Erkut 2008). 
 
Also, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) study the relationship between boardroom diversity and 
firm social performance. Their finding suggests that the more diversified boards are 
positively related to higher firm social performance.  
 
 
3.2. The effect of gender diversity on firm financial performance  
 
The first null hypothesis of this study can be stated as follows: 
 
H01: Board gender diversity has no impact on bank financial performance measured by 
market performance (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based performance (ROA and Net 
Interest Margin). 
 
Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) examine corporate governance, board diversity, and 
firm value of publicly traded Fortune 1000 firms. Their study focuses on 638 of 1000 
firms in 1997. To study the link between board gender diversity and firm financial value, 
they use both comparisons of means and regression analysis. They measure firm financial 
performance with Tobin’s Q which is a market-based measure.  Tobin’s Q is defined as 
the sum of the market value of stock and the book value of debt divided by the book value 
of total assets. In addition, they control for size, industry, and other corporate governance 
measures and find that the higher fraction of female board members is significantly and 
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positively associated with higher firm value. They also find that the fraction of female 
members increases with board size and firm size but decreases when the number of 
insiders rises.   
 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) study gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
financial performance. They investigate 68 non-financial firms listed on the continuous 
market in Madrid from 1995 to 2000. Like Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), they 
also measure firm financial performance using Tobin’s Q instead of accounting-based 
measures. They find that gender diversity has a positive impact on the value of Spanish 
firms. In addition, according to the study, the opposite causal relationship is not 
significant. Most empirical results in this area are based on the U.S. data. Instead, this 
study offers insight into the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance 
in Spain. Female participation in the workforce has historically been minimal in Spain, 
but recently the country has introduced legislation to improve equality of opportunities. 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera’s study shows that investors in Spain, does not avoid the 
firms with female board members, and greater gender diversity in the boardroom can lead 
to firm financial performance. 
 
Even if most of the studies find either a positive or negative correlation between board 
gender diversity and firm financial performance, there are still studies that do not find any 
statistically significant correlation. Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne (2008) 
study how the participation of female directors improves the firm financial performance 
and they find no statistically significant differences between firms with a higher 
proportion of female directors and firms with fewer female directors on the board. Instead, 
they find a significant and positive relationship between a number of women officers and 
firm financial performance when firms operate in a complex environment. Firm financial 
performance is measured by abnormal stock returns and using the Fama and French 
(1992, 1993) valuation framework. Their finding suggests that the more gender 
diversified boards are able to generate enough value to enable normal stock returns. The 
data is collected during the period from 2001 to 2004 and consists of firms in the Financial 
Post’s list of the 500 largest Canadian firms (FP500). However, this study does not 
address the problem of endogeneity which may have an impact on results. 
 31 
 
The study of Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010) examine how the number of 
ethnic minority directors and the number of female directors of the US boards and 
important board committees affects to the firm financial performance. In the line with 
Francoeur’s et al. (2008) study, they do not find a statistically significant relationship 
between either ethnic diversity or gender diversity and firm financial performance 
measured by ROA (return of assets) and Tobin’s Q. According to the study, the board 
diversity does not impact on firm financial performance and the decisions that relate to 
the appointment of female or ethnic minority director should base on to the other criteria 
than firm financial performance. Their data is collected during the period from 1998 to 
2002 and it contains firms in the S&P 500 index. 
 
Ahern and Dittmar’s (2012) study focus on Norwegian firms during the period from 2001 
to 2009. In 2003, the Norwegian government legislated the new law which required that 
40% of directors of Norwegian firms have to be women. Before gender quota law, only 
9% of directors were women. Ahern and Dittmar investigate all public limited Norwegian 
firms that are traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) anytime between 2001 and 2009. 
The primary goal of their study is to investigate the impact on the firm valuation of 
mandated female board representation. They also measure the firm value with the Tobin’s 
Q because of the accounting change during the transition period of the quota. They find 
that the stock prices dropped significantly at the announcement of the law caused by the 
constraint imposed by the quota. Furthermore, they recognize a large decline in Tobin’s 
Q during the following years. According to their study, the quota led the less experienced 
board as well as the younger board members, higher leverage and acquisitions, and the 
decline of operating performance. On the contrary to the other studies, the results of this 
study indicated the negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
financial performance. 
 
Marinova, Plantenga, and Remery (2015) study how gender diversity affects firm 
performance in Netherland and Denmark. Their study contains 186 publicly traded firms 
in 2007 and firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. They do not find any statistically 
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significant relationship between gender diversity and firm performance when the 
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q.  
 
Also, Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2015) investigate empirically whether greater 
gender diversity enhances firm financial performance by improving boards of directors’ 
efficiency. The data used in this study includes 3876 publicly traded firms from 47 
countries in the year 2010. In line with some earlier mentioned studies, also this study 
finds a positive and statistically significant correlation between greater gender diversity 
and firm financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. They do not consider 
the problems caused by endogeneity which may affect the results. 
 
García-Meca, García-Sánchez, and Martínez-Ferrero (2015) examine listed banks from 
nine different countries during the period from 2004 to 2010. They measure bank 
financial performance also with Tobin’s Q and ROA. The results of their study show that 
gender diversity on the board of the bank increases bank financial performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q and ROA. In addition, the evidence of their study suggests that institutional 
factors such as investor protection and bank regulation regime play a significant role in 
this relationship.  
 
Perryman, Fernando, and Tripathy (2016) investigate gender diversity in top management 
teams and whether gender diversity has an impact on firm performance and firm risk. 
They measure firm performance with Tobin’s Q and used a relatively long time period, 
from 1992 to 2012 in their study. The data set contains observations from 2566 firms and 
firms that operate in regulated industries, financial and utility firms, are excluded in their 
data set. According to their study, firms with greater gender diversity in top management 
teams perform better and show a lower risk than firms with lower level of gender 
diversity. 
 
Also, Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes and Laffarga (2017) examine the relationship 
between gender diversity in the boardroom and economic performance of Spanish firms. 
They measure economic performance by Tobin’s Q and their study includes 125 non-
financial, publicly listed firms during the period from 2005 to 2009. According to their 
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study, an increase in the level of female representation in boardrooms is positively 
correlated with economic success measured by Tobin’s Q. In addition, the evidence of 
their study shows that the number of female board members increased by over 98 % 
during the investigated period. This increase was, at least partially, affected by gender 
quota enacted in 2007 which promotes women as boardroom members. 
 
One of the recent researches is a study from Gordini, Niccolò and Elisa Rancati (2017) 
which focuses on the Italian companies. In 2011, the Italian government enforced a law 
which prescribes a gender quota for boards of directors. Thereby, the research examines 
the association between gender diversity in the Italian boardrooms and firm financial 
performance when the performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. Their data is collected 
during the period from 2011 to 2014 and it contains 918 Italian listed companies. The 
evidence from this study suggests that the greater gender diversity in the boardrooms does 
not destroy the shareholder’s value and more gender diversified boards may generate 
economic gains and other benefits for the companies. 
 
Based on the results of the previous studies that measure firm performance with Tobin’s 
Q, the first hypothesis tested in empirical analysis can be formed as follows: 
 
H11: Board gender diversity has an impact on bank financial performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q. 
 
An early study of Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997) investigates the relationship 
between the percentage of female board members and firm financial performance 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Their study consists of 
approximately 200 US firms of Fortune’s 500 firms in 1992. Evidence from some tests 
of their study suggests that the relationship between the percentage of female board 
members and firm financial performance is statistically negative.  
 
Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) investigate the relationship between board diversity 
measured by the percentage of female directors or minorities and firm financial 
performance which is measured by the return of asset and investments. The findings of 
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the study suggest that board diversity is positively related to firm financial performance. 
Their data is collected between the years 1993 and 1998 from 127 board of the directors 
of large US firms. According to the study, board diversity may be related to more effective 
board’s oversight functions. In addition, board diversity may lead to a decrease in agency 
issues. However, the study does not address the problems of endogeneity which may have 
an impact on results. 
 
Isidro and Sobral (2015) examine both direct and indirect effects of women on corporate 
boards on firm value, financial performance, and ethical and social compliance. They 
study firms included in the Financial Times 2011 classification of the 500 largest 
European firms from 16 different countries over the period 2010-2012. They do not find 
evidence that higher female representation on the board has a direct impact on the firm 
value measured by Tobin’s Q. Instead, they find indirect effects between female 
representation on the board and firm financial performance. According to the study, 
female board members are associated with better firm financial performance measured 
by return on assets and return on sales. In addition, female board members are positively 
associated with ethical and social compliance, which in turn, positively affect firm value. 
 
Low, Roberts, and Whiting (2015) research board gender diversity in Asian firms 
between the years 2012 and 2013. They study 6952 firms that are listed in Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore stock exchange. The evidence of their study 
suggests that an increasing number of female board members impacts positively firm 
performance measured by return on assets. However, a positive correlation between 
greater board gender diversity appears to be diminished if the country has high female 
representation in the workforce and high female empowerment. These results suggest that 
gender quotas and forcing female director appointment may lead to reduced financial 
performance in countries with strong cultural resistance. 
 
One of the most recent study, Owen’s and Temesvary’s (2018) study about the 
performance effects of gender diversity on banks boards, uses partly different 
performance measures as earlier studies. In their study, they apply two measures of 
overall bank performance, Revenue to Expense Ratio and Return on Assets ratio, and two 
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more bank-specific performance measures Share of Nonperforming Assets and Ratio of 
CEO to Average Staff Pay. According to their study, the previous mixed results related 
to gender diversity and firm performance are due to the fact that this relationship is U-
shaped instead of linear. The evidence of their study suggests that the relationship 
between board gender diversity and bank performance is U-shaped. In other words, the 
increase of the board gender diversity is positively affected with bank performance until 
the threshold of the gender level is achieved. However, they find this correlation only 
with banks which are wee capitalized. Their research focuses on the unbalanced data 168 
U.S. banks over the period from 1999 to 2015. 
 
Based on the studies that measure firm financial performance by return on assets, the 
second hypothesis tested in empirical analysis can be formed as follows: 
 
H21: Board gender diversity has an impact on bank financial performance measured by 
ROA (return of assets). 
 
Several studies that use return on assets as a dependent variable apply also return on 
equity in their studies. However, this study focuses on banks that have a regulated amount 
of equity. Based on this fact, net interest margin is applied instead of return on equity and 
the third hypothesis tested in empirical analysis is formed as follows: 
 
H31: Board gender diversity has an impact on bank financial performance measured by 
Net Interest Margin. 
 
 
3.3. The impact of bank regulation on different types of banks 
 
Also, the impact of Basel III regulation on banks with different level of board gender 
diversity is examined in this study and the second null hypothesis of the study is stated as 
follows: 
 
 36 
H02: The impact of bank regulation (Basel III) does not differ between different types of 
banks: banks with many female board members and banks with a few female board 
members. 
 
Based on the prior literature and the statistical information about the banks, banks have 
faced large changes in their operative environment which have had inescapable impacts 
on the banks’ corporate governance and other functions as well. For that reason, this study 
also investigates how Basel III, which is stipulated in 2014 (BIS 2011), affects different 
types of banks: those with many women on the board and those with only a few.  The test 
hypotheses are stated as follows: 
 
H12: The impact of bank regulation (Basel III) on bank performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q differs between different types of banks: banks with many female board members and 
banks with a few female board members. 
 
H22: The impact of bank regulation (Basel III) on bank performance measured by ROA 
differs between different types of banks: banks with many female board members and 
banks with a few female board members. 
 
H32: The impact of bank regulation (Basel III) on bank performance measured by Net 
Interest Margin differs between different types of banks: banks with many female board 
members and banks with a few female board members. 
 
 
 37 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter contains the introduction of the selected data and variables. After the 
introduction, the methodology of this study is presented. In addition, the last part of this 
chapter focuses on the empirical findings. 
 
 
4.1. Data and variables 
 
The sample used in the panel data analysis consists of the unbalanced panel data of the 
European publicly traded banks for the period 2011-2017. The countries are selected 
based on the banks’ total assets per year and only banks with total assets 25 M€ or over 
in 2011 are selected to the sample of this study. The European countries involved in this 
study are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Due to the limitations in the availability of 
data, the sample contains 65 banks and 602 observations. All selected banks are publicly 
traded and some of those banks are rated in numerous banks. Due to the several ratings 
in different banks, the market value which reflects the Tobin’s Q differs between different 
stock exchange for some of the banks. This led to an increase in the number of rated banks 
that are involved in this study and the total number of rated banks is 86. This means that 
21 banks of 65 banks have a different market value in different stock exchange and those 
banks are listed twice in the dataset of this study. The period from 2011 to 2017 is chosen 
because of the importance of the recent effect of the board gender diversity on bank 
financial performance. The accounting, stock market, and corporate governance data used 
in this study are obtained from ThomsonReuters. 
 
How to measure firm performance differs in prior literature and two different approaches 
can be found, market-based measures and accounting-based measures. In this study, both 
approaches are applied, and the study mainly follows the prior literature placing the 
dependent variables. Tobin’s Q is used in some of the latest studies, such as Carter et al. 
(2010), Campbell and Minquez-Vera (2008), Adams and Ferreira (2009), Reguera-
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Alvarado et al. (2017), and Tobin’s Q is also used in this study as a measure of the market-
based firm performance. Tobin’s Q is defined as the sum of the market value of stock and 
the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is used to 
measure the investor’s future expectations of the company’s value and performance 
(Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). The companies with Tobin’s Q ratio greater than 1.0 are 
expected to use available resources effectively and through that to create more value in 
the future. Instead, if the Tobin’s Q ratio is less than 1.0 the company is expected to 
benefit poorly available resources. (Lindenberg and Ross 1981.) 
 
Return on assets and net interest margin measure firm performance from the accounting-
based perspective. Particularly, ROA (return on assets) is a widely used measure in prior 
literature (Shrader et al. 1997; Erhardt et al. 2003; and Isidro and Sobral 2015). The return 
on assets is defined as net income (before extraordinary items) divided by the total value 
of assets and it measures a company’s profitability in relation to its total assets. In other 
words, ROA measures how efficiently the company’s resources are utilized to generate 
income. 
 
Several studies, such as Shrader et al. (1997), Staikouras et al. (2007), and Furthermore 
et al. (2012) use return on equity (ROE) to measure firm performance from accounting-
based perspective. However, this study focuses on the banks instead of companies in the 
other industries and banks have a regulated amount of equity. Due to the regulations, net 
interest margin is applied in this study to measure firm performance by accounting-based 
measure, together with ROA. Net interest margin is defined as investment returns minus 
interest expenses divided by average earning assets and it measures a bank’s success to 
invest its funds in relation to its expenses on the same investments. It is the gap between 
the interest incomes of the loans and securities that banks are received and the interest 
expenses of the bank’s borrowed funds. Generally, the higher net interest margin ratio of 
the bank, the higher the bank’s profitability is, and the more stable the bank is. This 
causality makes net interest margin ratio as one of the key profitability measures of the 
banks. (Ongore and Kusa 2013.) 
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There are numerous sources of motivation to use Tobin’s Q together with accounting-
based measures, ROA and net interest margin. First, Tobin’s Q measures investors’ 
expectations of the future and for that reason, it is a good proxy for a competitive 
advantage of companies (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988). It also explains the risk and 
focuses on the future’s expected performance (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). In 
addition, Tobin’s Q is less sensitive for asset valuation principles that are managed by the 
company’s management (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988). While Tobin’s Q focuses 
on the future, the accounting-based measures count the company’s prior performance and 
based on the events that have already occurred. Also, accounting-based ratios are 
important determinants when explaining the company’s value-adding which affects to the 
firm performance. For instance, ROA measures produced accounting incomes to the 
shareholders and net interest margin measures how successfully the company has 
invested its funds. When applying both, market-based variable and accounting-based 
variables, the different aspects of firm financial performance can be captured.  
 
The independent variable of the regression, Women %, indicates the percentage of 
women on the board of directors which is widely used in the literature (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009; Campbell and Minquez-Vera 2008). The lagged variable is used to capture 
the effect of earlier changes in the percentage of female board members.  
 
Based on prior research, several country, firm, and board level control variables are 
defined. Size of the company is normally used as a control variable in the studies which 
examine the firm performance due to the fact that company’s size is one of the main 
determinants of company value and company performance. Among other things, the 
company’s size is related to its market returns (Fama and French 1992). Also, size is 
associated with greater monitoring costs due to the complexity of the bigger companies. 
The negative correlation between size and company performance is expected based on 
the results of prior literature (Carter et al. 2010; Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008; 
Adams and Ferreira 2009; Isidro and Sobral 2015). In this study, the size of the company 
is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Even if the several studies have added 
firm age as a control variable, in this study, the firm age is excluded from the set of control 
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variables due to the statistically insignificant results in the previous studies (Low et al. 
2015; Isidro and Sobral 2015).  
 
Leverage ratio measures a company’s debt level and it is measured by total debt to total 
assets. Debt is an important mechanism to force directors and managers to generate free 
cash flows to payments of the principal and interest. Thereby debt is one of the 
mechanisms for decreasing the agency conflicts (Isidro and Sobral 2015). Based on the 
previous researches, such as Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) and Isidro and Sobral 
(2015), the association between debt level and firm performance is expected to be 
negative. 
 
Non-performing loans ratio measures a company’s non-performing loans to its total loans. 
The studies, such as Kolapo et al. (2012) and Ghosh (2015) find the negative relationship 
between the bank’s non-performing loans level and profitability measured by return on 
assets. Also, in this study, this correlation is expected to be negative. Deposit ratio 
measures a bank’s profitability and it is defined as a bank’s total deposits divided by its 
total assets. The relationship between the deposit ratio and bank financial performance is 
expected to be a positive based on Trujillo-Ponce’s (2013) study. Loans to deposit ratio 
measures banks liquidity as well as banks credit risk. It is measured by total loans to total 
deposits and the higher the ratio is, the higher the risk for illiquidity and insolvency is. 
(Samad & Hassan 2006.) The correlation between loans to deposit ratio and bank 
performance is expected to be negative based on the outcome of the study of Arif & Anees 
(2012). 
 
Previous researches find that the leadership structure of the firm has an impact on firm 
performance. In this study, leadership structure is measured by placing a dummy variable 
of CEO duality. CEO duality dummy represents if the position of the firm’s CEO and the 
chair of the Board are combined. The association between CEO duality and firm 
performance is widely examined but as mentioned earlier, the results are not 
straightforward. Numerous studies (Adams et al. 2005; Faleye 2007; Adams and Mehran 
2012) do not find a significant association between CEO duality and firm financial 
performance. However, there are also studies (Fooladi 2011; Dury et al. 2016) which find 
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a negative and statistically significant correlation between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Based on these results, the association is expected to be negative. 
 
Board size measures the number of board members. Optimal board size may improve 
firm financial performance. Numerous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Eisenberg et 
al. 1998; Mak et al. 2005; Guest 2009) find the negative correlation between the firm size 
and its financial performance. These results suggest that the smaller board size may be 
optimal for firms. Based on the results of these studies, the impact of board size is 
expected to be negative.   
 
Independent % measures the percentage of independent board members. De Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) state in their study that less independent boards may offer several 
benefits to firms including more effective monitoring and advising role and improved 
value creation. However, some of the studies (Bhagat and Black 2001; Faleye 2007; 
Fooladi 2011) do not find any statistically significant correlation between a board with a 
higher percentage of independent board members and firm performance. In this study, the 
association is expected to be positive. 
 
In addition, the number of board meetings is controlled because previous studies find a 
statistically significant correlation between the number of board meetings and firm 
financial performance. Vafeas (1999) find a negative association between board meeting 
frequency and firm performance when Ntim and Osei (2011) find that either relatively 
small or large number of board meetings is positively correlated with firm performance. 
Based on these mixed results, the correlation is expected to be statistically significant, but 
the direction can be either negative or positive. 
 
Following the previous studies such as Adams and Ferreira (2009), Carter et al. (2010), 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012), country dummies, year dummies, and bank fixed effects are 
applied in the study. In addition, all control variables are lagged one period in order to 
capture the effect of earlier changes. One-year lag is used because Carter et al. (2010) 
argue that the results from one-year lag and two-year lag are essentially the same.  
 
 42 
In the difference-in-differences estimation model, three dummy variables are used. A 
dummy variable of DLawYear indicates whether the Basel III has already stipulated or 
not. Basel III stipulated in 2014 and all years before the year 2015 get the value of 0. The 
years 2015-2017 gets the value of 1. A dummy variable of DWomen indicates the 
representation of female board members. Banks with less than 22.82 % women on their 
boards belong to the group of “only a few women in the boardroom” and these banks get 
the value of 0. The banks with 22.82 % or more women on their board belong to the group 
of “many women in the boardroom” and get the value of 1. This allocation based on the 
mean value of the percentage of female board members which is presented in Table 3. 
The third dummy variable, the dummy variable of DInter indicates the interaction 
between these two previously mentioned dummy variables. 
 
 
4.2. Methods 
 
Following Carter et al. (2003), the association between board gender diversity and bank 
financial performance is examined using both, the univariate test of means and the panel 
data analysis. Using the panel data method, firms from different countries with the 
different institutional environment are included in the sample which allows the 
elimination of unobservable homogeneity and biased omitted variables among the 
companies in the sample (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008). In addition, increased 
heterogeneity affects positively to the robustness and generalization of the results. Thus, 
a more reliable picture can be formed using the panel data analysis if compares to the 
cross-sectional analysis. Furthermore, the standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity by applying the White test and the correlation between the variables is 
examined by using Pearson correlation test. 
 
When studying the relationship between board characteristics such as the board gender 
diversity and firm performance, the possible causality problem arises. The direction of 
causality can be either that the board gender diversity affects the firm performance or that 
the firm performance effects the board gender diversity. This problem of causality may 
imply the join endogeneity of variables (Marinova et al. 2016.) Several previous studies 
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(Adams and Ferreira 2009; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) suggest that the relationship 
between most of the board characteristics, including board gender diversity, and firm 
performance is endogenous. 
 
Several different ways are used to solve the problems caused by endogeneity in previous 
researches. Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), and Carter et al. (2010), firm fixed 
effects are applied to solve the problem of endogeneity in this study. Instead, Carter et al. 
(2003), Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2007), and Carter et al. (2010) use two-stage 
(2SLS) or three-stage (3SLS) least squares instead of OLS to address the problem of 
endogeneity and some studies (Dittmar 2012; Reguer-Alvarado et al. 2017) use 
instrumental variables which are only correlated with percentage of female board 
members, but which are uncorrelated with bank performance. 
 
Following Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Low et al. (2015) the hypotheses are tested by 
applying the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation. In the analysis, the 
regression is utilized to examine whether the percentage of female board members is 
associated with bank financial performance. The regressions that measure firm financial 
performance with Tobin’s Q, ROA, or net interest margin are stated simultaneously as 
follows: 
 
Perform = b 0 + S b 1 Wt-1 + S b 2 TAt-1 + S b 3 TDt-1	+ S b	4	NPLt-1		 (1) 
+ S b 5	TDt-1	+ S b 6	TLt-1	+ S b 7	DCD	t-1	+ S b	8 BSt-1       
 +S b 9 IBMt-1+ S b 10 BMt-1 + S b 11 CDt-1  
+ S b 12	YDt-1	+ S b 13	BFEt-1	+ e  
 
where, 
Perform Performance measured by Tobin’s Q / ROA / Net Interest Margin 
W t-1 Percentage of women on the board of directors  
TA t-1 Ln (Total assets) 
TD t-1 Percentage of total debt from total assets 
NPL t-1 Percentage of non-performing loans from total loans  
TD t-1 Percentage of total deposits from total assets 
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TL t-1 Percentage of total loans from total deposits 
DCD t-1 A dummy variable of CEO duality (Y=1, N=0) 
BS t-1 Ln (Board size = number of directors) 
IBM t-1 Percentage of independent board members 
BM t-1 Ln (Number of board meetings per year) 
CD t-1 Country dummy 
YD t-1 Year dummy 
BFE t-1 Bank fixed effects 
e Error term 
 
When studying how the Basel III has impacted on banks with different level of board 
gender diversity, the hypothesis is tested by using a difference-in-difference estimation 
model. Difference-in-differences (DID) estimation model is one of the most popular 
models used in the applied research in economics. With this model, the impact of public 
interventions such as the prescription of new regulation, and other treatment of interest 
on outcome variables can be investigated. (Abadie 2005.) The regression that measures 
the difference-in-differences is stated as follows: 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 = 	b 0 + b 1DLawYear		+ b 2DWomen + b 3DInter +	e  (2) 
 
where, 
Perform Performance measured by Tobin’s Q / ROA / Net Interest Margin 
DLawYear A dummy variable of Basel III (stipulated = 1, not yet stipulated = 0) 
DWomen A dummy variable of women representation (³ 22.82 % women on the 
board = 1, < 22.82 % = 0) 
DInter A dummy variable of interaction between DLawYear and DWomen 
 
A significant and positive coefficient estimate (b1>0) will confirm the research 
hypotheses. In case the coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant or negative, the 
research hypothesis is rejected. 
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4.3. Empirical findings 
 
This section consists of the regression result of the investigation of the relationship 
between board gender diversity and bank financial performance. First, the descriptive 
statistics of variables is presented. After the descriptive statistics, the results from 
Pearson’s correlation test, as well as from the univariate test of means, are presented. The 
section continues by stating the test results from the OLS regression analysis (equation 
1). Finally, the test results from the difference-in-differences estimation analysis 
(equation 2) are presented. 
 
Table 1 below reports the descriptive statistics of variables. The mean and median of 
Tobin’s Q are near to one (1.001) and (0.990) which shows that the market value of bank 
reflects solely to the bank’s recorded assets. The maximum value of 1.875 shows that 
these banks are expected to generate 87.5 % more value in the future and the minimum 
value of 0.867 shows that these banks are expected to benefit poorly available resources 
in the future. Among the largest listed European banks, the average ROA is 0.491 % and 
the median is 0.63 %. The mean of net interest margin is 2.279 % and the median is 
1.94%. 
 
On average, 22.799 % of the board members are women in the largest listed European 
banks. Banks with the highest female board members rate have only slightly over 50 % 
(53.850) women in their boards and still, there are banks without any female board 
members on their boards. These values show that even if the percentage of female board 
members has increased during the last years as can be seen from Figure 1, it is still at a 
relatively low level. The average natural logarithm of banks total assets is 19.224 and 
average total debt to total assets percentage is 28.994 %. The average non-performing 
loans ratio for the largest European banks is 9.443 % when the average deposit ratio is 
47.032 % and the loans ratio is 168.929 %. 65.2 % of banks have a combined position for 
the position of bank CEO and the position of the Chair of the board. On average, the 
boards have 14.675 board members and 53.868 % of their board members are 
independent. However, in some banks, 100 % of board members are independent when 
in some banks, none of the board members are independent. The average amount of board 
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meetings per year is 14.366 but some banks have 68 meeting during one calendar year 
when some of the banks have arranged only 4 board meetings for one year.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
Correlation between the variables is investigated by using the Pearson correlation test and 
the result of the test are reported in Table 2 below. As can be expected, the correlation 
between the Tobin’s Q and ROA is statistically significant and positive (0.3061) but the 
uncorrelation between net interest margin and other performance variables is surprising. 
The correlation between board gender diversity and Tobin’s Q is not statistically 
significant when the correlation between board gender diversity and ROA is statistically 
highly significant and positive. Instead, the correlation between board gender diversity 
and net interest margin is negative and significant. 
 
Bank’s size, as well as the leverage ratio which measures bank’s debt level, non-
performing loans ratio, loans to deposit ratio, CEO duality, and the percentage of 
independent board members are negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Deposit ratio is the 
only ratio which has a positive correlation with Tobin’s Q. ROA is also positively 
correlated with Deposit ratio, but negatively correlated with all other control variables. 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Tobin's Q 1.001 0.990 0.090 1.875 0.867
ROA 0.483 0.620 1.409 4.990 -12.420
Net Interest Margin 2.258 1.930 1.200 6.540 0.72
Women % 22.818 23.080 12.900 53.850 0.000
Size 19.201 19.158 1.382 21.534 16.409
Leverage 29.030 28.771 14.159 86.386 0
Non-Performing Loans 9.550 5.140 12.119 64.070 0.080
Deposits 47.195 45.945 16.889 81.800 3.100
Loans to Deposit 168.731 125.660 224.857 2823.270 66.170
CEO Duality 0.657 1.000 0.475 1.000 0.000
Board Size 14.602 14.000 4.890 30.000 2.000
Independent % 54.056 58.330 24.576 100.000 0.000
Board Meetings 14.484 12.000 7.555 68.000 4.000
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However, net interest margin ratio correlates positively with the number of board 
members, CEO duality, deposits ratio, and non-performing loans ratio. The negative 
correlation exists between net interest margin ratio and leverage ratio, loans to deposit 
ratio, the percentage of independent board members, and the number of board meetings 
per year.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2, board gender diversity is correlated with all control variables 
except with the number of board meetings. This points out the importance of the control 
variables in the regression analysis. The size of the company, leverage ratio, loans to 
deposit ratio, and the percentage of independent board members are positively correlated 
with the percentage of female board members. Instead, non-performing loans ratio, 
deposit ratio, CEO duality which shows if the position of company’s CEO and the Chair 
of the board are combined, and the number of board members are negatively correlated 
with the percentage of the women on the board of directors.  
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Table 3 below reports the result of the univariate test of means. Based on the mean of the 
percentage of board gender diversity, the banks are divided into two categories: banks 
with zero or a few women on the board and banks with many women on the board. Banks 
with less than 22.82 % of female board members belong to the preceding group and banks 
with 22.82 % or more female board members belong to the latter group. As can be seen 
from Table 3, the results of the mean test are in line with the Pearson correlation test. The 
difference between the mean values of Tobin’s Q is statistically insignificant when the 
difference between the means of ROA is statistically significant and positive. This means 
that on average, the banks with many women on their boards have a higher ROA ratio 
when compared to the banks with zero or only a few women on their boards. Furthermore, 
the banks with many female board members have lower net interest margin than banks 
with a few women on their boards which is also in line with the Pearson correlation test. 
 
The mean of bank’ size which is measured by the total assets of the bank and the mean 
of the percentage of independent board members are higher for the banks with many 
women in their board. Instead, leverage ratio, non-performing loans ratio, deposits ratio, 
loans to deposits ratio, CEO duality, number of board members, and the number of board 
meetings are smaller for the banks with many female members in their board than the 
banks with only a few women in the board. 
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Table 3. Comparison of banks with many females on the board to those with only a 
few. 
 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 % 
 
 
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates of the relationship between board gender diversity and 
bank financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, 
is a market-based measure for the bank’s financial performance. Tobin’s Q measures the 
investor’s future expectations of the company’s value and performance.  It is defined as 
the sum of the market value of stock and the book value of debt divided by the book value 
of total assets. The independent variable, Women % (-1), is lagged value of the percentage 
of women on the board of directors. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, the association between the percentage of female board 
members and Tobin’s Q is positive and statistically significant at 1 % level. In addition, 
the result in Table 4 shows the statistically significant correlation between most of the 
control variables and Tobin’s Q. As assumed, the relationship between bank size 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, and Tobin’s Q is negative and 
statistically significant at 5 % level. Bank’s leverage ratio which is measured by total 
Firm Characteristics
Mean for banks with 
few women in the 
board
Mean for banks with 
many women in the 
board
Difference
Tobin's Q 1.005 0.995 -0.010
ROA 0.329 0.681 0.352***
Net Interest Margin 2.499 1.881 -0.618***
Women % 15.162 32.100 16.938***
Size 18.703 19.797 1.094***
Leverage 30.123 27.723 -2.400***
Non-Performing Loans 11.786 6.829 -4.957***
Deposits 50.299 43.318 -6.981***
Loans to Deposit 190.790 141.920 -48.870***
CEO Duality 0.727 0.570 -0.157***
Board Size 14.911 14.228 -0.683***
Independent % 49.833 59.094 9.261***
Board Meetings 15.618 13.166 -2.452***
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debts divided by the total assets, also affects negatively to Tobin’s Q as earlier assumed, 
but the estimate is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the correlation between non-
performing loans ratio measured by the non-performing loans to total loans, and Tobin’s 
Q is negative and statistically significant at 1 % level. Deposit ratio which is defined as 
total deposits divided by the total assets, as well as the loan ratio measured by total loans 
to total deposits, are both positively and statistically significantly associated with Tobin’s 
Q. 
 
Instead, the coefficient estimate for CEO Duality, which shows whether the position of 
CEO and The Chair of the board are combined or not, is negatively correlated with 
Tobin’s Q. The result is statistically significant at 1 % level and it is in line with earlier 
researches (Fooladi 2011; Dury et al. 2016). As can be noticed from Table 4, this test 
does not find any significant correlation between board size measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of board members and Tobin’s Q. The percentage of independent 
board members is negatively and statistically significantly associated with Tobin’s Q. 
Finally, the coefficient estimate for board meetings which is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the number of board meetings shows that the number of board meetings is 
not correlated with Tobin’s Q. In addition, country dummies, year dummies, as well as 
the bank fixed effects are applied in the analysis to avoid the problem of endogeneity. 
 
 
  
 52 
Table 4. Impact of board gender diversity measured by the percentage of female board 
members on European banks’ financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 % 
 
 
Table 5 shows the OLS estimates of the relationship between board gender diversity and 
bank financial performance measured by ROA. The dependent variable, ROA is an 
accounting-based variable which is defined as net income (before extraordinary items) 
divided by the total value of assets. ROA measures the company’s profitability in relation 
to its total assets. 
 
Importantly, as can be seen from Table 5, the coefficient estimate for the percentage of 
women on the board of directors is positive and statistically significant at 1 % level. This 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Region: Europe
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
C 1.3553*** 8.1794
Women % (-1) 0.0004*** 2.8152
Ln Bank Size (-1) -0.0135** -1.9714
Leverage (-1) -0.0001 -1.4770
Non-Performing Loans (-1) -0.0018*** -5.2925
Deposits (-1) 0.0011*** 3.9552
Loans (-1) 0.0001*** 5.0654
CEO Duality (-1) -0.0328*** -4.0110
Ln Board Size (-1) 0.0000 0.0017
Independent % (-1) -0.0004*** -3.0282
Ln Board Meetings (-1) 0.0108 0.5763
Country Dummy Yes
Year Dummy Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
R-squared 0.3038
Adjusted R-squared 0.2748
F-statistic 10.4738
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000
Number of observations 326
Number of banks 72
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evidence suggests that the banks with more female members on their board of directors 
have approximately 1.02 % higher ROA value than banks with only a few women on their 
board. The estimated coefficients for the control variable are mostly in line with the 
estimates in Table 4 but the coefficient estimates are statistically significant only for some 
of the control variables. 
 
The relationship between bank size and bank financial performance measured by ROA, 
as well as the relationship between leverage ratio and bank financial performance 
measured by ROA, are negative and statistically insignificant. However, the association 
between non-performing loans and ROA is statistically significant at 1 % level and 
negative. The coefficient estimate for the deposit ratio is positive but statistically 
insignificant. In line with results in Table 4, the correlation between loans ratio and ROA 
is positive and significant at 1 % level and the correlation between CEO Duality and ROA 
is negative and significant at 1 % level. The estimated coefficients for other variables, for 
board size, the percentage of independent board members, and the number of board 
meetings are statistically insignificant. These findings provide strong evidence of the 
positive association between the percentage of women on the board of directors and bank 
financial performance measured by return on assets. 
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Table 5. Impact of board gender diversity on European banks’ financial  
performance measured by ROA. 
 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 % 
 
 
Table 6 reports the results from OLS regression which investigates the relationship 
between the percentage of female board members and bank financial performance 
measured by net interest margin. The dependent variable, net interest margin, measures a 
bank’s success to invest its funds in relation to its expenses on the same investments. It is 
defined as investment returns minus interest expenses divided by average earning assets. 
 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for the percentage of women on the board of 
directors is negative and statistically significant at 1 % level. The evidence suggests that 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Region: Europe
Dependent Variable: ROA
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
C 1.7346 0.7361
Women % (-1) 0.0102*** 3.6744
Ln Bank Size (-1) -0.0666 -0.7005
Leverage (-1) -0.0060 -0.8480
Non-Performing Loans (-1) -0.0277*** -3.1183
Deposits (-1) 0.0152 1.5748
Loans (-1) 0.0056*** 4.5169
CEO Duality (-1) -0.4126*** -7.2197
Ln Board Size (-1) -0.0008 0.0060
Independent % (-1) 0.0008 0.2324
Ln Board Meetings (-1) -0.0618 -0.8339
Country Dummy Yes
Year Dummy Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
R-squared 0.2463
Adjusted R-squared 0.2109
F-statistic 6.9631
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000
Number of observations 291
Number of banks 72
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the higher percentage of female board members is associated with a decline in the value 
of net interest margin. On average, banks with the higher female representation 
percentage on the board of directors have 2.37 % lower net interest margin ratio. In line 
with the result in Table 5, the association between bank size and net interest margin is 
negative and statistically insignificant. Instead, leverage and non-performing loans ratios 
are statistically significant at 1 % level. The leverage ratio is negatively correlated with 
net interest margin when the correlation between the non-performing loans ratio and net 
interest margin is positive. The latter relationship is inverse when compares to the results 
in Tables 4 and 5.   
 
The coefficient estimates for deposit ratio, loans ratio, and CEO Duality are statistically 
insignificant. Differing from the results in Tables 4 and 5, the relationship between the 
board size and bank financial performance measured by net interest margin is positive 
and significant at 1 % level. In line with the results in Table 5, the relationships between 
the percentage of independent board members and bank performance, as well as the 
number of the board meeting and bank performance, are statistically insignificant. 
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Table 6. Impact of board gender diversity on European banks’ financial  
performance measured by Net Interest Margin. 
 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 % 
 
 
All in all, the results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide strong evidence of the association 
between board gender diversity and bank financial performance. The evidence suggests 
the positive relationship between the board gender diversity and bank financial 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA, and the inverse relationship between the 
board gender diversity and bank financial performance measured by net interest margin. 
 
Next, the impact of Basel III on banks with different level of board gender diversity is 
examined. Table 7 reports the results of the difference-in-differences analysis. As can be 
Method: Panel Least Squares
Region: Europe
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margin
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
C 8.3309 1.4443
Women % (-1) -0.0237*** -6.1417
Ln Bank Size (-1) -0.1683 -0.9689
Leverage (-1) -0.0704*** -24.5156
Non-Performing Loans (-1) 0.0767*** 4.9913
Deposits (-1) -0.0399 -1.2863
Loans (-1) 0.0058 0.6590
CEO Duality (-1) -0.1233 -0.9669
Ln Board Size (-1) 0.7152*** 3.5641
Independent % (-1) -0.0047 -1.2369
Ln Board Meetings (-1) -0.0451 -0.2784
Country Dummy Yes
Year Dummy Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
R-squared 0.4065
Adjusted R-squared 0.3489
F-statistic 7.0596
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
Number of observations 148
Number of banks 39
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seen, when bank performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, the estimated coefficient for 
Law Year dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at 5 % level. This result 
suggests that the value of Tobin’s Q has decreased over the sample period. Interestingly, 
the coefficient estimate for Women dummy variable is negative and significant at 1 % 
level. This means that regardless of the prescription of new regulation, Basel III, banks 
with a higher percentage of female board members have a lower value of Tobin’s Q when 
compared to the banks with a lower percentage of female board members. The coefficient 
estimate for interaction dummy is positive and significant at 5 % level. This result 
suggests that after the prescription of the Basel III, banks with a higher percentage of 
women on the board had 1.76 % higher value of Tobin’s Q than the banks with a lower 
level of women on the board. 
 
As can be seen, the estimated coefficients for the interaction dummy variable are 
statistically insignificant when the bank performance is measured by ROA or net interest 
margin. This result suggests that the impact of Basel III on ROA or net interest margin 
does not differ across the different types of banks: banks with many women on the board 
or banks with zero or a few women on the board.  
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Table 7. Impact of Basel III on banks with many women on the board and those banks 
with only a few. 
 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 % 
  
Method: Panel Least Squares
Region: Europe
Dependent Variable
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 1.0125*** 579.9140 0.2755 1.3437 2.5099*** 25.1285
Law Year -0.0189** -2.4392 0.1455 0.6748 -0.0270 -0.2687
Women -0.0158*** -8.2922 0.4440** 2.2463 -0.4781** -2.1376
Interaction 0.0176** 2.3419 -0.1777 0.2250 -0.2363 -1.0351
R-squared 0.0084 0.0186 0.0598
Adjusted R-squared 0.0031 0.0121 0.0477
F-statistic 1.5891 2.8841 4.9589
Prob(F-statistic) 0.1901 0.0354 0.0023
Number of observations 575 575 575
Number of banks 86 86 86
Tobin's Q ROA Net Interest Margin
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Numerous previous researches and the theory of corporate governance support the 
argument that there is a link between the board structure and firm performance. One of 
the dimensions of board structure is the demographic diversity on the board, which may 
have an impact on the firm performance. However, the results from previous studies that 
have focused on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance 
(listed in Appendix 2.) are mixed. The purpose of this study is to provide empirical 
evidence on the correlation between board gender diversity and bank financial 
performance in large European banks. In addition, the impact of Basel III which stipulated 
in 2014, on the banks with different level of board gender diversity is investigated. 
 
Focusing on the largest European banks with total assets 25 million euros or more in 2011 
and controlling country, firm, and board level variables, the result of this study indicates 
the positive correlation between the percentage of women on the board and firm financial 
performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. The banks with more women on their 
board have approximately 1.02 % higher ROA ratios and 0.04 % higher Tobin’s Q ratios 
than banks with fewer women on their boards. However, the results are inverse when the 
financial performance is measured by net interest margin. The Banks with higher female 
board members percentage have 2.37 % lower net interest margin ratios compared to the 
banks with lower female board members percentage. These results provide strong 
evidence that large European banks with a higher percentage of female board members 
are more profitable measured by ROA.  Also, these banks are expected to perform better 
also in the future than banks with a lower percentage of female board members when the 
future’s expectations are measured by Tobin’s Q.  
 
In addition, studying how the Basel III has affected bank financial performance in 
different types of banks regarding women portion on their boards, I find that after the 
prescription of Basel III, banks with a higher proportion of women on their board have 
1.76 % higher Tobin’s Q. This study does not find similar statistically significant 
correlation between the Basel III and banks with more women on their board when the 
bank performance is measured by ROA and net interest margin. These results suggest that 
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the impact of Basel III on bank market value measured by Tobin’s Q is positive for the 
banks with more female board members. However, the impact of Basel III on bank’s 
profitability measured by ROA and net interest margin does not differs across different 
types of banks: those with many women on their board and those with zero or only a few. 
 
The hypotheses tested in this study are developed based on the previous studies and 
theories that are earlier presented. The result of this analysis reported in Table 4, 5 and 6 
reject the first null hypothesis and confirm the test hypotheses. However, the result in 
Table 7 rejects the null hypothesis only partly. The first test hypothesis can be confirmed 
based on the empirical evidence in Table 7, but the empirical evidence is not enough to 
reject the null hypothesis or confirm the other two (2. and 3.) test hypotheses. 
 
This study focuses on only the large banks in European countries and thus the results 
cannot be generalized. In the other continents, or in the other industries or among the 
smaller companies, the results may be different due to different operating environments 
and different principles of corporate governance.  
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Appendix 1. Banks. 
Country Bank 
Austria ERSTE GROUP BANK AG 
RAIFFEISEN BANK 
Belgium KBC GROUP NV 
DEXIA SA 
Cyprus BANK OF CYPRUS 
Czech Republic KOMERCNI BANKA, A.S. 
Denmark DANSKE BANK A/S 
JYSKE BANK A/S 
Finland NORDEA BANK ABP 
POHJOLA BANK 
France CREDIT AGRICOLE SA 
STE. GENL. DE FRANCE 
NATIXIS 
BNP PARIBAS SA 
Germany DEUTSCHE BANK AG 
COMMERZBANK AG 
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG 
Greece ALPHA BANK SA 
NATL BANK OF GREECE 
EUROBANK ERGASIAS SA 
PIRAEUS BANK 
BANK OF GREECE SA 
Hungary OTP BANK NYRT 
Ireland BANK OF IRELAND 
PERMANENT TSB GROUP 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTESA SANPAOLO 
UNICREDIT SPA 
MEDIOBANCA SPA 
BANCO BPM SPA 
UNIONE DI BANCHE 
BANCA MONTE PASCHI 
BPER BANCA SPA 
BANCA CARIGE 
BANCA POPOLARE 
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Italy BANCA PICCOLO 
CREDITO EMILIANO SPA 
Netherlands ING GROEP N.V. 
Norway DNB ASA 
Poland POWSZECHNA KASA 
BANK PEKAO S.A. 
SANTANDER BANK 
Portugal BANCO COMERCIAL PORT 
BANCO BPI, S.A. 
BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO 
Spain BANCO SANTANDER SA 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA 
CAIXABANK 
BANKIA 
BANCO SABADELL 
BANKINTER S.A. 
BANCO POPULAR ESP. 
BANCO ESPANOL DE CREDITO 
Sweden SWEDBANK AB 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN 
SV. HANDELSBANKEN AB 
Switzerland UBS GROUP AG 
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP 
JULIUS BAER 
BANQUE CANT VAUDOISE 
UK 
 
 
 
 
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP 
BARCLAYS PLC 
ROYAL BANK 
STANDARD CHARTERED 
TSB BANKING 
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Appendix 2. Table of previous studies. 
 
* data from Compustat and ExecuComp 
 
Year Research P. measure Effect
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003)
1997
 Fortune 1000
Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
1995-2000
Madrid stock exchange
Francoeur, Labelle and Sinclair-Desgagne 
2001-2004
FP500
Adams and Ferreira
2009 1996-2003 Tobin's Q and ROA Negative
US Firms
Carter, D'Souza, Simkins and Simpson 
1998-2002
SP 500
Ahern and Dittmar
2001-2009
Oslo stock exchange
Marinova, Plantenga and Remery 
2007
Netherland & Denmark
Terjesen, Couto and Francisco 
2010
47 different countries
García-Meca, García-Sánchez and Martínez-Ferrero 
2004-2010
9 different countries
Perryman, Fernando and Tripathy 
1992-2012
2566 firms*
Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes and Laffarga 
2005-2009
Spanish stock exchange
Gordini and Rancati 
2011-2014
Italian stock exchange
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles 
1992
Fortune 500
Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader 
1993-1998
US Firms
Isidro and Sobral
2010-2012
European 500 largest firms
Tobin's Q Insignificant 
Low, Roberts and Whiting 
2012-2013
Asian firms
Owen and Temesvary
1999-2015
U.S. Firms
2015 ROA Positive
2018 ROA + 3 other U-Shaped
2003 ROA and ROI Positive
2015 ROA and ROS Positive
2017 Tobin's Q Positive
1997 ROA and ROE Negative
2017 Tobin's Q Positive
2015 Tobin's Q and ROA Positive
2016 Tobin's Q Positive
2015 Tobin's Q Insignificant
2015 Tobin's Q and ROA Positive
2010 Tobin's Q and ROA Insignificant
2012 Tobin's Q Negative
2008 Tobin's Q Positive
2008 Abnormal stock returns Insignificant
Tobin's Q Positive2003
